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Abstract
This study builds a North-South trade and uneven development model, and investigates
the eects of changes in income distribution (the profit share) on economic growth rates
of both countries. How a change in the profit share aects both countries’ growth rates
diers for the short-run equilibirum and the long-run equilibrium. For example, in the
short-run equilibirum, an increase in the profit share of the North deteriorates the terms
of trade of the South, and then, decreases the growth rate of the South. On the other
hand, in the long-run equilibrium, an increase in the profit share of the North either
increases or decreases the growth rate of the South through Thirlwall’s law.
Keywords: North-South trade; Thirlwall’s law, uneven development, income distribu-
tion
JEL Classification: F10; F43; O11; O41
1 Introduction
One of the important contributions of the post Keynesian growth theory is the theory of
balance of payments constraint growth developed by Thirlwall (1979). This theory states
that the growth rate of a country is determined by the equilibirum of trade balance, and is
Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University. E-mail: sasaki@econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp
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named Thirlwall’s law after the name of the founder.1) Thirlwall’s law is given by
gH =
"EX
"IM
gW ; (1)
where gH denotes the growth rate of a home country; gW , the growth rate of the rest of the
world; "EX, the income elasticity of export demand; and "IM, the income elasticity of import
demand. That is, the growth rate of a country is determined by the income elasticity of
export demand, the income elasticity of import demand, and the growth rate of the world.
Thirlwall’s law is derived from the condition that trade balance of a country is in equilibirum:
the value of export demand is equal to the value of import demand.2)
Dutt (2002) gives an interpretation along North-South trade to Thirlwall’s law, and shows
that the ratio of the growth rate of the South (a developing country) to the growth rate of the
North (a developed country) is equal to the ratio the income elasticity of the Northern import
demand to the income elasticity of the Southern import demand.
gS
gN
=
"N
"S
< 1 =) gS < gN ; (2)
where gS denotes the growth rate of the South; gN , the growth rate of the North; "N , the
income elasticity of Northern import demand; and "S , the income elasticity of Southern
import demand. In reality, the income elasticity of Northern import demand is likely to be
smaller than that of Southern import demand. Then, the growth rate of the South is less
than the growth rate of the North, and hence, the income gap between the two countries will
expand through time. Therefore, as long as the two countries are engaged in North-South
trade, the income gap between the North and the South will increase.
There are many models that consider development of the North and the South under the
North-South trade framework. For example, Findlay (1980) models a situation where the
North is a Solow-type economy in which labor and capital are fully employed while the
South is a Lewis-type economy in which surplus labor exists and hence, the real wage rate
is fixed. Dutt (1996) models a situation where both the North and the South face fixed real
wage rates.3)
Our model is based on the model of Dutt (2002). Dutt models a situation where the
North is a Kalecki-type economy and the South is a Lewis-type economy, and investigates
the relationship between the terms of trade and both countries’ growth rates in both the
1) For Thirlwall’s law, see also McCombie and Thirlwall (1994), Thirlwall (2012), and Soukiazis and
Cerqueira (2012).
2) For further developments of Thirlwall’s law, see Blecker (1998) and Nakatani (2012).
3) For the relationship between North-South trade and development of both countries, see also Blecker
(1996).
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short-run and the long-run equilibria.4) In the short run, both countries’ capital stocks are
assumed to be constant, and the capacity utilization of the North and the terms of trade of
the South are endogenous variables. In the long run, both countries’ capital stocks evolve by
capital investment, and hence, the terms of trade also changes. In the long-run equilibirum,
Thirlwall’s law holds.
Almost all studies of Thirlwall’s law specify ad hoc export and import demand func-
tions, and derive Thirlwall’s law by using those functions. In contrast, Dutt (2002) derives
Thirlwall’s law by specifying production and demand structures of both countries. Hence,
Dutt’s (2002) model is micro-founded.5)
However, Dutt (2002) does not investigate how a change in income distribution aects
the growth rates of both countries. A change in labor-management negotiations aects in-
come distribution between workers and capitalists, and the change in income distribution
aects economic growth. In two-country models, a change in income distribution of one
country can aect the other country through a change in the terms of trade. Therefore, it
is important to investigate the eect of a change in income distribution on both countries’
growth rates.
For this purpose, we incorporate a Marglin and Bhaduri’s (1990) investment function
into Dutt’s (2002) model, and analyze how changes in income distributions of both countries
aect the short-run and long-run equilibrium values. The investment function used in Dutt
(2002) is called a Kalecki-type investment function, which is increasing in the capacity
utilization rate. In contrast, the Marglin-Bhaduri investment function is increasing in both
the capacity utilization rate and the profit share, and widely used in theoretical and empirical
analyses of Kaleckian models.6) With the Kalecki-type investment function, we usually
obtain the result of wage-led growth such that an increase in the profit share (i.e., a decrease
in the wage share) decreases the growth rate of the economy. On the other hand, with the
Marglin-Bhaduri type investment function, we obtain not only wage-led growth but also
profit-led growth such that an increase in the profit share increases the growth rate of the
economy. Therefore, we can examine broader possibilities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model.
4) For a study that models Thirlwall’s law under North-South trade, see also Vera (2006). Sasaki (2009)
presents a dynamic version of the Ricardian trade model with a continuum of goods that assumes that the
North is in full employment while the South faces unemployment. Then, he derives a multi-goods version of
Thirlwall’s law.
5) For Thirlwall’s law, there is a criticism as to why not factor endowments but trade balance equilibrium
constrains the long-run growth rate. For this, see Pugno (1998) who presents a model in which Thirlwall’s law
holds in the long-run equilibirum because of adjustments of some variables.
6) For the basic framework of the Kaleckian model, see Rowthorn (1981). Sasaki (2013) presents a Kaleckian
model that captures cyclical fluctuations of the capacity utilization rate, the profit share, and the employment
rate.
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Section 3 derives the short-run equilibrium, investigates the stability of the short-run equi-
librium, and conducts a comparative static analysis of the short-run equilibrium. Section 4
derives the long-run equilibrium, investigate the stability of the long-run equilibrium, and
conducts a comparative static analysis of the long-run equilibrium. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Model
Suppose the world economy that is composed of the North and the South. The North pro-
duces the investment-consumption goods, which are used for investment and consumption
in both the North and the South. The South produces the investment-consumption goods,
which is used for consumption in the North while used for investment and consumption in
the South.
The North is a Kalecki-type economy. The principle of eective demand prevails and
hence, outputs are determined by eective demand. Capital stocks are not fully utilized.
The goods market is in imperfect competition and hence, the price of the Northern goods
is determined by mark-up pricing. With mark-up pricing, the profit share, that is, the ratio
of total profit income to national income is decided by the mark-up rate. The goods market
clears through the adjustment of the capacity utilization rate. The nominal wage rate is
assumed to be determined by labor-management negotiations and exogenously given. With
the mark-up pricing, the real wage rate that firms in the North face is constant and actual
employment is determined by labor demand.
The South is a Lewis-type economy. Say’s law prevails and hence, outputs are deter-
mined by supply. The goods market of the South is competitive and clears through the
adjustment of the price. Capital stocks are fully utilized. In the South, surplus labors exist
and hence, the real wage rate is fixed at a certain level. With the fixed real wage rate, actual
employment is determined by labor demand.
The Northern goods are produced by employment and capital stock. The production
function takes the following Leontief form.
YN = minfEN=bN ; uNKNg; bN > 0; (3)
where YN denotes the output of the Northern goods; EN , employment; KN , capital stock; bN ,
the labor input coecient; and uN , the capacity utilization rate.7)
7) Let the potential output be YFN . Then, the capacity utilization rate is given by uN = YN=Y
F
N . Suppose that
the ratio of capital stock to the potential output KN=YFN is constant. Then, the output-capital ratio YN=KN will
be a proxy variable of the capacity utilization rate.
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The Southern goods are produced by employment and capital stock. The production
function takes the following Leontief form.
YS = minfES =bS ;KS =aS g; bS > 0; aS > 0; (4)
where YS denotes the output of the Southern goods; ES , employment; KS , capital stock; bS ,
the labor input coecient; and aS , the capital input coecient.
The price of the Northern goods is determined by unit labor costs multiplied by the
mark-up rate.
PN = (1 + z)WNbN ; 0 < z < 1; (5)
where PN denotes the price; z, the mark-up rate; andWN , the nominal wage rate. The mark-
up rate and the nominal wage rate are exogenously given.
Let the profit share of the North be N . Then, by using equation (5), we obtain the
following relation.
N =
PNYN  WNEN
PNYN
= 1   WNEN
PNYN
=
z
1 + z
: (6)
Accordingly, the profit share has a one-to-one relationship with the mark-up rate and is
an increasing function of the mark-up rate. This means that the profit share is decided by
the mark-up rate. Kalecki himself states that it is the monopoly power that determines the
markup rate. Later, many Kaleckians interpret it broadly, and argue that not only monopoly
power but also negotiations between workers and firms aect the mark-up rate.
We assume that the real wage rate of the South is constant and exogenously given.
WS
PS
= VS : (7)
With equation (7), the profit share of the South is given by
S =
PSYS  WSES
PSYS
= 1   bSVS : (8)
Since the labor input coecient and the real wage rate are constant, the profit share is also
constant. When bS declines by technical progress or VS declines for some reason, the profit
share of the South increases.
Workers in the North spend all wage income on consumption and therefore do not save.
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Capitalists in the North spend a fraction sN of profit income on saving and the rest 1  sN on
consumption. Both workers and capitalists allocate a fraction  of consumption expenditure
to purchase of the Southern goods and the rest 1  to purchase of the Northern goods. The
fraction  is assumed to be
 = 0Y
"N 1
N P
1 N ; P =
PS
PN
; 0 > 0; "N > 0; N > 0; (9)
where 0 denotes a positive constant; P = PS =PN , the terms of trade of the South; "N , the
income elasticity of Northern import demand; and N , the price elasticity of Northern import
demand. According to Dutt (2002), we assume that "N < 1.
Workers in the South spend all wage income on purchase of the Southern goods. Cap-
italists in the South spend a fraction sS of profit income on saving, a fraction  of the rest
1  sS of profit income on purchase of the Northern goods, and the rest 1   on purchase of
the Southern goods. The fraction  is assumed to be
 = 0(SYS )"S 1P1 S ; 0 > 0; "S > 0; S > 0; (10)
where 0 denotes a positive constant; "S , the income elasticity of Southern import demand;
and S , the price elasticity of Southern import demand. According to Dutt (2002), we
assume that "S > 1.
Following Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), we assume that the capital investment function
in the North is an increasing function of the capacity utilization rate and the profit share.
gN  INKN = 0 + 1uN + 2N ; 0 > 0; 1 > 0; 2 > 0; (11)
where IN , investment; and i (i = 0; 1; 2), a positive constant. Dutt (2002) assumes that the
investment function is an increasing function of the capacity utilization rate, which corre-
sponds to the case of 2 = 0 in equation (11).
The value of Northern import from the South is equal to the value of Southern export to
the North, which is given by
PSXS = (1   sNN)PNYN : (12)
From equation (12), the volume of Southern export is given by
XS = 0(1   sNN)P NY"NN : (13)
The value of Southern import from the North is equal to the value of Northern export to
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the South, which is given by
PNXN = SPSYS : (14)
From equation (14), the volume of Northern export is given by
XN = 0
"S
S P
SY"SS : (15)
The excess demand for the Southern goods, EDS , is given by
EDS = CS S + IS S + XS   YS ; (16)
where CS S denotes Southern consumption demand for the Southern goods; and IS S , South-
ern investment demand for the Southern goods. Since YS = CS S + IS S +MS and MS = XN=P
hold, equation (16) can be rewritten as
EDS = XS   (1=P)XN : (17)
The excess demand for the Northern goods, EDN , is given by
EDN = CNN + IN + XN   YN ; (18)
where CNN denotes Northern consumption demand for the Northern goods. Since YN =
CNN + MN + S N and MN = PXS hold, equation (18) can be rewritten as
EDN = IN   S N + XN   PXS : (19)
3 Short-run equilibrium
We define a short run as a situation where both countries’ capital stocks KN and KS are
constant. The short-run equilibrium is achieved when EDS = 0 and EDN = 0. From our
assumption, the saving of the North is given by
S N = sNNYN : (20)
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Therefore, the terms of trade that establishes EDS = 0 and the capacity utilization rate that
establishes EDN = 0 are given by
P =
"
0(1   sNN)
0
"S
S
(uNKN)
"N
 
KS
aS
! "S # 1N+S  1
; (21)
uN =
0 + 2N
sNN   1 : (22)
For the capacity utilization rate to be positive, we need sNN > 1. This condition means
that the response of saving to capacity utilization rate exceeds the response of investment
to capacity utilization rate. In the literature of Kaleckian models, this condition is often
called the Keynesian stability condition because as will be shown below, it is a condition
for the goods market stability. In the following analysis, we assume the Keynesian stability
condition.
Assumption 1. The Keynesian stability condition sNN > 1 holds.
From our assumption, the saving of the South is given by
S S =
sSSKS
aS
: (23)
Since investment of the South is composed of both the Northern and the Southern goods, we
assume that investment of the South is given by
IS = PS S ; 0 <  < 1; (24)
where  denotes a parameter that captures the eect of a change in the terms of trade on
investment of the South. Substituting equation (23) into equation (24) and dividing the
resultant expression by KS , we obtain the growth rate of the South.
gS =
sSS
aS
P =) gS =
sSS
aS
(P): (25)
Therefore, the growth rate of the South is an increasing function of the terms of trade.
Substituting uN into equation (20), we obtain the growth rate of the North.
gN =
sN(0 + 2N)N
sNN   1 : (26)
We examine the local stability of the short-run equilibirum. Since the excess demand
for the Southern goods is adjusted by P while the excess demand for the Northern goods are
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adjusted by uN , we assume the following adjustment processes.
P˙ =  

XS   XNP

;  > 0; (27)
u˙N = 
 
IN
KN
  S N
KN
+
XN
KN
  PXS
KN
!
;  > 0; (28)
where  and  are adjustment parameters. Note that capital stock of the North KN is fixed
in the short run.
Substituting equations (11), (13), (15), and (20) into equations (27) and (28), we obtain
P˙ =  
"
0(1   sNN)P N (uNKN)"N   0"SS PS 1
 
KS
aS
!"S #
; (29)
u˙N = 
 
0 + 1uN + 2N   sNNuN   P  P˙
 KN
!
: (30)
We define the Jacobian matrix corresponding to the above dynamical system as J. Each
element of J is given by
J11 =
@P˙
@P
=   0(1   sNN)(N + S   1)P N 1(uNKN)"N ; (31)
J12 =
@P˙
@uN
=  ("N0
"S
S P
 Nu"N 1N K
"N
N ) > 0; (32)
J21 =
@u˙N
@P
=   P
 KN
J11; (33)
J22 =
@u˙N
@uN
= 
 
1   sNN   P
 KN
J12
!
< 0: (34)
All elements of J are evaluated at (uN ; P
). With the Keynesian stability condition sNN >
1, we have J22 < 0.
The necessary and sucient conditions for the local stability of the short-run equilibirum
are that the determinant of J is positive and the sum of diagonal elements of J are negative,
that is, det J > 0 and tr J < 0. These are computed as follows:
det J = J11(1   sNN); (35)
tr J = J11 + J22: (36)
If J11 < 0, both det J > 0 and tr J < 0 hold because J22 < 0 from equation (34) and sNN >
1. The necessary and sucient condition for J11 < 0 is given by N + S   1 > 0, which is
called the Marshall-Lerner condition. Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. The necessary and sucient condition for the stability of the short-run equi-
librium is equivalent to the Marshall-Lerner condition.
Figure 1 shows the phase diagram for the short run.
u
N
= 0

P = 0
O
P
u
N
P

u

N
Figure 1: Phase diagram of the capacity utilization rate and the terms of trade in the short
run
We investigate the eect of an increase in the profit share of the North on the growth rate
of the North.
@gN
@N
=
sN f (N)
(sNN   1)2 ; (37)
where
f (N) = sN2
 
N   1sN
!2
  01  
2
2
1
sN
; (38)
f (0) =  01 < 0; (39)
f (1) = sN2   212   01: (40)
With the Keynesian stability condition, we should consider the domain of the profit share
N 2 (1=sN ; 1). The sign of @gN=@N is equal to the sign of f (N). Hence, we should
investigate the sign of f (N).
When f (1) < 0, we always have f (N) < 0 for N 2 (1=sN ; 1). Therefore, when
f (1) < 0, the economy exhibits a wage-led growth.
When f (1) > 0, we define cN as the profit shere such that f (
c
N) = 0. Then, we have
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f (N) < 0 for N 2 (1=sN ; cN) while f (N) > 0 for N 2 (cN ; 1). Therefore, the economy
exhibits a wage-led growth for N 2 (1=sN ; cN) while a profit-led growth for N 2 (cN ; 1).
Proposition 2. When sN2   212   01 < 0, the North exhibits a wage-led growth. When
sN2   212   01 > 0, the North exhibits a wage-led growth for N 2 (1=sN ; cN) while
exhibits a profit-led growth for N 2 (cN ; 1).
When using the Kalecki-type investment function, that is 2 = 0 in our model, we always
have f (N) < 0, that is, only a wage-led growth regime is obtained.
Results for comparative static analysis of the short-run equilibirum are as follows.
First, the eects of an increase in the profit share of the North on the capacity utilization
rate, the growth rate of the North, the terms of trade, and the growth rate of the South are
given by
N "=) uN #; gN " or #; P #; gS # (41)
An increase in the profit share of the North deteriorates the terms of trade of the South and
hence, decreases the growth rate of the South.
Second, the eects of an increase in the profit share of the South on the capacity utiliza-
tion rate, the growth rate of the North, the terms of trade, and the growth rate of the South
are given by
S "=) uN ; gN ; P #; gS " or # (42)
An increase in the profit share of the South has two opposite eects on the growth rate of
the South. First, an increase in the profit share of the South increases the saving of Southern
capitalists, and accordingly, has a positive eect on the growth rate of the South. In contrast,
an increase in the profit share of the South deteriorates the terms of trade, and hence, has a
negative eect on the growth rate of the South. Depending on which eect dominates, the
eect of an increase in the profit share of the South on the growth rate of the South diers.
@ log gS
@ log S
=
N + S   1   "S
N + S   1 R 0: (43)
When the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, the denominator of the right-hand side is posi-
tive. However, the sign of the numerator is indeterminate. The South is a supply-constrained
economy. When an economy is supply-constrained, an increase in the profit share increases
the saving and hence, increases the growth rate of the economy if it is under autarky. On
the other hand, if it is engaged in international trade, it can be a wage-led growth economy
because of the terms of trade eect even if it is a supply-constrained economy.
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In summary, for the eects of changes in income distribution, we obtain the following
two propositions:
Proposition 3. In the short-run equilibrium, an increase in the profit share of the North
either increases or decreases the growth rate of the North while decreases the growth rate
of the South.
Proposition 4. In the short-run equilibirum, an increase in the profit share of the South does
not aect the growth rate of the North while either increases or decreases the growth rate of
the South.
4 Long-run equilibrium
We define a long run as a situation where the short-run equilibirum always holds and capital
accumulation in each country proceeds because of capital investment. That is, KN and KS
evolve in the long run. In this case, the short-run equilibrium value of the terms of trade P
also evolves. We define a long-run equilibirum as a situation where P˙ = 0.8)
We examine the dynamics of the terms of trade. Dierentiating P with respect to time,
we obtain
P˙
P
=
1
N + S   1("NgN   "SgS ): (44)
Equation (44) can be rewritten as
P˙ =
1
N + S   1
"
"NgN   "S sSS (P
)
aS
#
P: (45)
The long-run equilibirum is defined by P˙ = 0, and the long-run equilibrium terms of
trade is given by
P =
"
"N
"S
 aS
sSS
 sN(0 + 2N)N
sNN   1
# 1

: (46)
Since the short-run equilibirum growth rate of the North is independent of the terms of
trade, the long-run equilibirum growth rate of the North is equal to the short-run growth rate
of the North.
8) In many two-country growth models, as Dutt (2002) also states, the long-run equilibirum is assumed to be
a situation where both countries grow at a same rate and the capital stock ratio KN=KS is constant. However,
in our and Dutt models, the terms of trade continues to decrease when both countries grow at a same rate, and
this situation cannot be the long-run equilibirum.
12
The long-run equilibirum growth rate of the South is given by
gS =
"N
"S
gN =)
gS
gN
=
"N
"S
< 1: (47)
This corresponds to Thirlwall’s law. That is, if the income elasticity of Southern import
demand is larger than the income elasticity of Northern import demand, then the growth rate
of the South is smaller than that of the North: the income gap between the two countries will
expand through time.
We investigate whether the long-run equilibrium is locally stable. The necessary and
sucient condition for the stability of the long-run equilibirum is given by dP˙=P < 0 in
the neighborhood of the long-run equilibirum. When we actually compute the derivative,
we obtain
dP˙
dP

P=P
=   "NgN
N + S   1 < 0: (48)
Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5. If the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied, then the long-run equilibirum
is locally stable.
Figure 2 shows the phase diagram for the long run.

P
O
PP

Figure 2: Phase diagram of the terms of trade in the long run
Results of comparative static analysis of the long-run equilibirum are as follows.9)
9) In the Appendix, we investigate the eect of an increase in the profit share of each country on the real
wage rate of the North in the short-run and the long-run equilibria.
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First, the eects of an increase in the profit share of the North on the capacity utilization
rate, the growth rate of the North, the terms of trade, and the growth rate of the South are
given by
N "=) uN #; gN " or #; P " or #; gS " or # (49)
Since Thirlwall’s law holds in the long-run equilibirum, an increase in the profit share of the
North has a similar eect on the growth rates of both countries.
Second, the eects of an increase in the profit share of the South on the capacity utiliza-
tion rate, the growth rate of the North, the terms of trade, and the growth rate of the South
are given by
S "=) uN  ; gN  ; P #; gS   (50)
An increase in the profit share of the South deteriorates the terms of trade but does not aect
the growth rate of the South.
Proposition 6. In the long-run equilibirum, an increase in the profit share of the North
either increases or decreases the growth rate of the North. When the growth rate of the
North increases, the growth rate of the South increases. In contrast, when the growth rate
of the North decreases, the growth rate of the South decreases.
Proposition 7. In the long-run equilibrium, an increase in the profit share of the South does
not aect the growth rate of the North and that of the South.
5 Concluding remarks
This study extends the Dutt’s (2002) model that describes uneven development between the
North and the South under North-South trade, and investigates changes in income distribu-
tions on both countries’ economic growth rates. In our analysis, to capture both a wage-led
growth regime and a profit-led growth regime, we use a Marglin-Bhaduri-type investment
function instead of a Kalecki-type investment function that is used in Dutt (2002).
Our analysis shows that how a change in the profit share aects both countries’ growth
rates diers for the short-run equilibirum and the long-run equilibrium. For example, in the
short-run equilibirum, an increase in the profit share of the North deteriorates the terms of
trade of the South, and then, decreases the growth rate of the South. On the other hand, in
the long-run equilibrium, an increase in the profit share of the North, through Thirlwall’s
law, either increases or decreases the growth rate of the North. These results suggest that an
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income redistribution policy in one country aects the other country’s growth rate through
international trade.
Income distributions of the North and the South in our model are exogenously given.
However, in reality, income distribution is endogenously determined and aected by the
economic growth rate. Therefore, to endogenize income distribution is an important issue
and will be left for future research,
Appendix: real wage rate of the North
We investigate the eect of an increase in the profit share of the North on the real wage
rate of the North. As in the text, we assume that workers in the North consume both the
Northern and the Southern goods. Hence, the real wage rate that workers in the North face
VN is assumed to be given by
VN =
WN
PSP
1 
N
=
1
P(1 + z)bN
=
1   N
PbN
: (51)
The short-run equilibrium value of the real wage rate of the North is given by
VN =
1   N
bN
"
0(1   sNN)
0
"S
S
(uNKN)
"N
 
KS
aS
! "S #  N+S  1
: (52)
To investigate the eect of an increase in the profit share of the North on the real wage rate
of the North, we take the logarithm of VN as follows:
logVN = log(1   N)  
0(uNKN)
"N 1(P)1 N
N + s   1 [log(1   sNN) + "N log u

N] +    : (53)
Since @VN=@N = V

N@ logV

N=@N , we examin the sign of @ logV

N=@N . If  is constant,
then we obtain
@ logVN
@N
=   1
1   N +

N + S   1
 
sN
1   sNN  
"N2
0 + 2N
+
"N sN
sNN   1
!
R 0: (54)
Therefore, an increase in the profit share of the North either increases or decreases the real
wage rate of the North in the short-run equilibirum. Actually, let N = 0:3,  = 0:5,
N = 0:9, S = 2:5, sN = 0:5, "N = 0:7, 0 = 0:04, 1 = 0:04, and 2 = 0:09. Then,
we obtain uN = 0:61 and g

N = 0:09. In this case, the economy exhibits a profit-led growth
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because a slight increase in N increases gN . We obtain @ logV

N=@N =  0:72 < 0. On the
other hand, let 1 = 0:09 and 2 = 0:04 keeping other parameters same. Then, we obtain
uN = 0:87 and g

N = 0:13. In this case, the economy exhibits a wage-led growth because a
slight increase in N decreases gN . We obtain @ logV

N=@N = 1:51 > 0.
We can easily know that an increase in the profit share of the South increases the real
wage rate of the North in the short-run equilibrium.
Proposition 8. Suppose that both countries are located in the short-run equilibrium. Then,
an increase in the profit share of the North either increases or decreases the real wage rate
of the North. On the other hand, An increase in the profit share of the South increases the
real wage rate of the North.
The long-run equilibrium value of the real wage rate of the North is given by
VN =
1   N
bN
 
"N
"S
 aS
sSS
 gN
!  
: (55)
To investigate the eect of an increase in the profit share of the North on the real wage rate
of the North, we take the logarithm of VN as follows:
logVN = log(1   N)  
0(uN KN)
"N 1(P)1 N

log gN +    : (56)
Capital stock of the North KN continues to increase at the rate of gN > 0 at the long-run
equilibrium. With "N < 1, the term K
"N 1
N approaches zero. Accordingly, the second term of
the right-hand side approaches zero. In this case, we obtain
@ logVN
@N
=   1
1   N < 0: (57)
Therefore, an increase in the profit share of the North decreases the real wage rate of the
North in the long-run equilibrium.
We can easily know that an increase in the profit share of the South increases the real
wage rate of the North in the long-run equilibrium.
Proposition 9. Suppose that both countries are located in the long-run equilibrium. Then,
an increase in the profit share of the North decreases the real wage rate of the North. On
the other hand, an increase in the profit share of the South increases the real wage rate of
the North.
16
References
Blecker, R. A. (1996) “The New Economic Integration: Structuralist Models of North-South
Trade and Investment Liberalization,” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 7,
pp. 321–345.
Blecker, R. A. (1998) “International Competitiveness, Relative Wages, and the Balance-of-
Payments Constraint,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 20 (4), pp. 495–526.
Dutt, A. K. (1996) “Southern Primary Exports, Technological Change and Uneven Devel-
opment,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 20, pp. 73–89.
Dutt, A. K. (2002) “Thirlwall’s Law and Uneven Development,” Journal of Post Keynesian
Economics 24 (3), pp. 367–390.
Findlay, R. (1980) “The Terms of Trade and Equilibrium Growth in the World Economy,”
American Economic Review 70 (3), pp. 291–299.
Marglin, S. and Bhaduri, A. (1990) “Profit-Squeeze and Keynesian Theory,” in S. Marglin
and J. Schor (eds.) The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Expe-
rience, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
McCombie, J. S. L. and Thirlwall, A. P. (1994) Economic Growth and the Balance of Pay-
ments Constraint, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Nakatani, T. (2012) “Significance of Post-Keynesian Economics: Kalacki-Steindl Propo-
sition and its Extensions to Open Wage-Led Economies,” Post Keynesian Review 1
(1/2), pp. 17–37.
Pugno, M. (1998) “The Stability of Thirlwall’s Model of Economic Growth and the Balance-
of-Payments Constraint,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 20 (4), pp. 559–581.
Rowthorn, R. E. (1981) “Demand, Real Wages and Economic Growth,” Thames Papers in
Political Economy, Autumn, pp. 1–39.
Sasaki, H. (2009) “North-South Ricardian Trade and Growth under the Balance of Payments
Constraint,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 31 (2), pp. 299–324,
Sasaki, H. (2013) “Cyclical Growth in a Goodwin-Kalecki-Marx Model,” Journal of Eco-
nomics 108 (2), pp. 145–171.
Soukiazis, E. and Cerqueira, P. A. eds. (2012) Models of Balance of Payments Constrained
Growth: History, Theory and Empirical Evidence, Basingstoke, UK: PalgraveMacmil-
lan.
17
Thirlwall, A. P. (1979) “The Balance of Payments Constraint as an Explanation of Interna-
tional Growth Rate Dierences,” Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 32,
pp. 45–53.
Thirlwall, A. P. (2012) “Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Models: History and
Overview,” in Soukiazis and Cerqueira (2012), pp. 11–49.
Vera, L. V. (2006) “The Balance-of-Payments-Constrained Growth Model: A North-South
Approach,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 29 (1), 67–92.
18
